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Postanarchism: a politics of
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SAUL NEWMAN
Department of Politics, Goldsmiths, University of London, New Cross, London SE14 6NW,
UK
ABSTRACT This article outlines a politics of postanarchism, which is based on a
radical renewal—via poststructuralist theory—of classical anarchism’s critique
of statism and authority and its political ethics of egalibertarianism. I contend that
while many of the theoretical categories of classical anarchism continue to be
relevant today—and indeed are becoming more relevant with the collapse of
competing radical projects and what might be seen as a paradigm shift from the
representative politics of the party and vanguard to that of movements and
decentralized networks—its humanist and rationalist epistemological framework
needs to be rethought in the light of poststructuralist and postmodern theories.
Here I develop an alternative understanding of anarchism based on a non-
essentialist politics of autonomy.
How should we think about radical politics today, at a time strongly marked by, on
the one hand, the collapse of the Communist state systems—and by, on the other
hand, the crisis of capitalism, or at least the ideological (and economic)
bankruptcy of its neoliberal form that predominated since 1989? The past two
decades have seen the breakdown of two rival political, economic and ideological
worlds; and the so-called Third Way, which provided the social democratic
window-dressing for an unfettered global capitalism, fared little better. Given
these conditions, what sort of horizon can radical political struggles today draw
upon? What kind of imaginary animates them?
This article contends that contemporary radical politics is characterized by a
‘libertarian impulse’, a heterodox anti-authoritarian current that has always been
present in radical politics, but that has for a long time been overshadowed,
marginalized and obscured by both Marxism and social democracy.1 This
heterogeneous current, however, has become more prominent today in the midst of
new forms of politics that take the shape of movements and decentralized networks
rather than political parties and vanguards, which are no longer organized around
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defined class identities and issues, and which therefore no longer conform to the
Marxist or social democratic models. Various movements and affinity groups that
converge around the themes of ‘alter-globalization’ or ‘anti-capitalism’, and that
are organized horizontally and in a de-centralized manner that defies hierarchy and
leadership, might be seen as an example of this libertarian politics2—a politics that
seeks autonomy from the state and rejects the idea of representation within the
formal channels of political power.
Furthermore, a certain libertarian impulse can be detected in radical political
thought today, particularly that which comes out of the continental tradition.
Indeed, many contemporary critical thinkers, such as Michael Hardt and Antonio
Negri, Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancie`re and Giorgio Agamben, have, in very
different ways, sought to theorize new modes of political action and subjectivity
that are no longer bound by the categories of class, party and state.3 It is not my
aim here to survey these discussions and debates on contemporary critical thought.
Yet it is worth remarking on the unacknowledged proximity between these
ideas and those of classical anarchism, and indeed, the debt that is owed here to this
much overlooked theoretical tradition.4 Many of the themes and preoccupations of
these contemporary thinkers seem to directly reflect the thought of the classical
19th-century anarchists, engaged as they were in major debates with Marx and
his followers over revolutionary strategy and the role of the state. Indeed, Hardt
and Negri’s claim that ‘We are not anarchists but communists’5 seems to belie a
much closer affinity with the anarchist tradition than they are willing to
acknowledge, especially with regard to their idea of a post-class collective
subject—the multitude—that emerges spontaneously in opposition to capitalism
and sovereignty.
Therefore, the libertarian moment that conditions both contemporary radical
politics and theory might perhaps be thought as an anarchist moment; at least it
draws its inspiration, in part, from anarchism. Therefore, present circumstances
demand at least a substantive re-engagement with the anarchist tradition. Indeed, it
is my contention that anarchism—or left-libertarianism—forms the horizon for
radical politics today, and has in a way always formed its horizon, being the
ultimate ethical and political expression of the twin imperatives of equality and
liberty that constitute the very language of emancipation. What I mean by this is
that because anarchism combines liberty and equality to the greatest possible
degree, it serves as an endpoint or limit condition for radical politics. For instance,
the post-revolutionary societies depicted by Marx and even Lenin—communist
societies of abundance and freedom, liberated from forced work, property and
centralized government, where ‘the free development of each is the condition for
the free development of all’—are precisely anarchist societies and are virtually
indistinguishable from many of the aspirations of anarchist thinkers and
revolutionaries. The celebration by Engels of the radical and decentralized
democracy of the Paris Commune of 1871 is mirrored in the admiration for the
same event expressed by anarchists such as Bakunin and Kropotkin, even though
the interpretations differed (for Engels it was the first example of the ‘dictatorship
of the proletariat’; whereas for Bakunin it signified something different,
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an anarchist social revolution6). While it is important to highlight the differences
between anarchism and Marxism as ideologies, we should be wary of drawing too
sharp a line here: one should, instead, recognize the heterogeneity and mutual
influence of both the traditions, which share, I would argue, a common imaginary
of statelessness.
The vital lesson that anarchism teaches, and continues to teach, radical politics
is that liberty and equality are inextricable, that they must always go together, and
that one cannot come at the expense of the other. At the heart of anarchism, then, is
a politics and ethics of equal-liberty, which might be summed up in the following
words of Bakunin:
I am free only when all human beings surrounding me—men and women alike—are equally
free. The freedom of others, far from limiting or negating my liberty, is on the contrary its
necessary condition and confirmation. I become free in the true sense only by virtue of the
liberty of others, so much so that the greater the number of free people surrounding me the
deeper and greater and more extensive their liberty, the deeper and larger becomes my
liberty.7
So, the condition for freedom is not only social and economic equality, but also
the equal freedom of others. Indeed, this could be considered the political ethics of
left-libertarianism or libertarian socialism more broadly.
Yet, where this libertarian position departs from other forms of socialism is not
simply in its insistence that individual liberty must not be sacrificed to economic
and social equality, but also its insistence that equal-liberty cannot be fully realized
within the framework of the state. The state imposes an inevitable constraint on
equal-liberty, and does so in two ways: its intervention in social relations will
always restrict liberty, imposing upon the people unnecessary regulations and an
arbitrary power that violates, as William Godwin claimed, individual autonomy,
self-determination and the ‘right of private judgement’.8 Similarly, the principle of
equality is violated if it is enforced by the state, since this would mean
a hierarchical principle of command and obedience, and thus the institutionaliza-
tion of a political inequality between the state and the people over whom it
exercises power. In this way, then, the thinking of the politics of equality and
liberty together—which as I have argued is the central task of radical politics—
necessitates at the same time a thinking of politics outside the state. Indeed, the
fundamental contribution of anarchism to radical politics is the unmasking of state
power—and here anarchism proved much more radical than Marxism—and the
elaboration of a politics that is autonomous from the state. I shall return to this
point later.
However, if present conditions demand a ‘return’ to anarchism, what sort of
return is possible here? It cannot simply be the restating of anarchism in its original
19th-century form. While there are many aspects of the classical anarchist tradition
that should be retained, not least of which is the political ethics of equal-liberty and
solidarity, there are other aspects that need to be revised in the light of more recent
theoretical and political developments. Indeed, this would apply to all forms of
radical thought—including anarchism and many forms of socialism—which have
postanarchism
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their foundations in the discourses of Enlightenment humanism and rationalism.
While it is certainly going too far to say that the Enlightenment is out of date—
indeed, what is timely here would be a rethinking and renewal of the Kantian spirit
of immanent critique9—the theoretical and epistemological conditions of what is,
perhaps problematically, termed ‘postmodernity’ demands at least an interrogation
of its limits and assumptions; assumptions about, for instance, the liberating
power of rationality and truth, and the transparency of the subject. Indeed, a whole
series of theoretical interventions, from Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis
to the poststructuralist thought of Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, and Deleuze and
Guattari, have cast doubt on some of the central categories of Enlightenment and
humanist thought. Yet, while these interventions have important implications for
classical anarchism, whose foundations do indeed lie in a certain humanism and
rationalism, they are not necessarily inimical to it, and indeed, as I have suggested
elsewhere10, there is a certain continuity between the anti-authoritarian impulse of
classical anarchism and the desire, central to poststructuralism and deconstruction,
to expose the inconsistencies in discourses of authority and the power effects of
ideas, practices and institutions that we have come to consider as politically
innocent.
In gesturing towards a new formulation of anarchism—what I call postanar-
chism11—let us try to understand some of the main implications of poststructuralist
theory for anarchist political philosophy:
The crisis of ‘metanarratives’
The postmodern condition has been most famously and succinctly summed up by
Jean-Francois Lyotard’s definition: an incredulity toward metanarratives.12 The
metanarrative is understood as a universal idea or discourse that is central to the
experience of modernity. This might be found in the notion of a universal
objective truth, and the idea that the world is becoming more rationally intelligible
through advances in science. Or it might be seen in the Hegelian dialectic, whose
unfolding determines history. Here we might also think of the Marxist discourse of
proletarian emancipation. All these ideas derive from the Enlightenment, and they
imply a truth that is absolute and universal, and that will (eventually) be rationally
grasped by everyone. Moreover, the metanarrative implies a certain knowledge
about society: society is understood either as an integrated whole or as internally
divided, as in the Marxist imagery of class struggle. Indeed, these two opposed
understandings of society are really mirror images of one another; they are united
by the common assumption that social reality is wholly transparent and
intelligible.
So why are these metanarratives breaking down; why do we no longer believe in
them? Lyotard explores the reasons for their dissolution in an examination of the
condition of knowledge in contemporary post-industrial society. According to
Lyotard, scientific knowledge is experiencing a crisis of legitimation, where the
rules of truth which determine what statements can be admitted to a ‘scientific’
body of statements, no longer operate as authoritatively as they once did. Because
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of certain transformations that knowledge is undergoing in the post-Industrial
Age, this process of legitimation has become ever more questionable and unstable:
the contingency and arbitrariness of its operation—the fact that it is ultimately
based on acts of power and exclusion—are becoming apparent, thus producing a
crisis of representation. In short, it is increasingly difficult for scientific knowledge
to claim a privileged status as being the only arbiter of truth. Does this not displace
the universal position of scientific knowledge; does science not become, under
the conditions of commodification and bureaucratization, just another form of
knowledge, another narrative? Moreover, Lyotard points to a breakdown of
the knowledge about society: society can no longer be adequately represented
by knowledge—either as a unified whole or as a class-divided body. The social
bonds that gave a consistency of representation to society are themselves being
redefined through the language games that constitute it. There is, according to
Lyotard, an ‘“atomization” of the social into flexible networks of language
games . . . ’.13 This does not mean that the social bond is dissolving altogether;
merely that there is no longer one dominant, coherent understanding of society
but, rather, a plurality of different narratives or perspectives. Here we might think
of the multiplicity of heterogeneous discourses, ideological perspectives, religious
sensibilities, moral positions and social identities that make up contemporary
societies.
This critique of the absolutism of scientific knowledge is also reflected in Paul
Feyerabend’s anarchist approach to science. His argument is that the
methodological rules imposed by science are ultimately arbitrary and historically
contingent, that they are not based on any firm claim to truth. Indeed, many of the
most important scientific discoveries—the Copernican Revolution, for instance—
were only possible through a breaking of the existing methodological rules. This
tells us that the authority of scientific knowledge, based on rigid rules of enquiry, is
on a much shakier ground than it would like to admit. It is much more productive,
according to Feyerabend, and indeed much closer to the truth of scientific enquiry,
to take an anarchist view of science—to question the authority and legitimacy of
scientific knowledge, and to violate its methodological rules. Indeed, Feyerabend
finds it extraordinary that anarchist political thinkers—and here he cites
Kropotkin—while questioning all forms of political authority, uphold unquestio-
ningly the epistemological authority of science, and indeed base their whole
philosophy on its rather uncertain claims.14 Why should the same freedom of
thought, speech and action, and the same scepticism about authority that anarchists
demand in the field of politics, not also translate into the field of scientific enquiry?
So the problem alluded to in Feyerabend’s critique is that classical anarchism
based itself upon a series of metanarratives, not only about mankind’s inevitable
revolt against state authority and the subsequent flourishing of human freedom, but
also about the emancipatory potential of scientific knowledge. What is central to
classical anarchist philosophy is a positivism that sees social relations as
constituted by self-regulating natural mechanisms, laws, relations and processes
which are rational and which, if left alone, would allow a more harmonious social
order, free from the distortions and oppression of state authority, to emerge.
postanarchism
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For instance, Bakunin posited the idea of ‘immutable’ natural laws and processes
whose truth would be revealed through science, and whose unfolding determined
social progress and the intellectual, moral and material development of humanity
from a state of slavery and ignorance to a state of freedom.15 A similar idea can be
found in Godwin’s rationalist anarchism, in which social improvements and the
emergence of a more just and equal society are closely bound up with the progress
of science, as well as the inevitable development of people’s moral and intellectual
capacities.16 This positivist approach is also evident in Kropotkin’s theory of
social relations and ethical relations as being based on an innate tendency towards
mutual aid and assistance, something which we have inherited from the animal
world and which is a major factor in evolutionary survival.17
However, if we were to adopt a position of incredulity or at least scepticism
towards metanarratives generally, and to the epistemological authority of scientific
knowledge in particular, we would have to reflect on the possibility of an
anarchism without these deep foundations in science and rationality; an anarchism
that did not make universal claims about human nature, natural laws or an
unfolding rationality immanent in social progress. We would have to conceive of
an anarchism that did not seek to make itself into a science. Instead, we should ask
Michel Foucault’s question, which he poses in response to the scientific aspirations
of Marxism: ‘ . . . “What types of knowledge are you trying to disqualify when you
say that you are a science?”’18 In other words, we must interrogate the power
effects and discursive gestures of exclusion inherent in laying claim to the status of
‘science’. It is not so much a question of whether scientific knowledge is right or
wrong, true or false, but rather the way in which it promotes a hierarchization of
knowledge and thus a certain discursive authoritarianism. In opposition to this we
should assert, as Foucault counsels us to do, a genealogical position, which is
that of ‘anti-science’. This does not mean that we must disregard the use of
scientific knowledge, or celebrate irrationalism, but rather that we retain a
critical perspective that is always sensitive to science’s power effects: ‘Genealogy
has to fight the power-effects characteristic of any discourse that is regarded as
scientific.’19 It is a question of politicizing knowledge, rationality and truth: in
other words, rather than according truth a universal position of abstract neutrality,
such that it can always be proclaimed in absolute opposition to the epistemological
distortions of power, it should be seen as a weapon wielded in a battle, spoken from
the partisan position of one directly engaged in struggle. We should think in terms
of, as Foucault puts it, an ‘insurrection of knowledges’.20 To do so would be to
extend the anarchist critique of political authority to the epistemological authority
of science.
A post-sovereign model of power
The second major implication of poststructuralist, and particularly Foucauldian,
theory lies in the formulation of a new concept of power, one that can no longer be
entirely contained within the classical revolutionary model central to anarchist
philosophy. Classical anarchism concentrates its revolutionary energy on the state,
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a structure in which power relations are said to be centralized and organized in a
hierarchical and authoritarian manner; a structure that intervenes in social life in
oppressive, irrational and destructive ways. Here the state enshrines the principle
of sovereignty—a ‘ruling principle’ of absolute authority that stands above social
relations, monopolizing violence, and embodying an inequality of power relations
and a symbolic absolutism that is inimical to the idea of a free society.
There is thus imagined, in classical anarchist thought, a kind of Manichean
opposition between society and the state. Bakunin, for instance, sharply
differentiates natural laws, which are constitutive of social relations and human
subjectivity, from the ‘artificial authority’ of state power and political institutions.
Governments and state institutions were ‘pneumatic machines’ that were ‘entirely
mechanical and artificial’, in contrast to freely formed social relations.21 That was
why—in contrast to the Marxists for whom the state was an apparatus that could be
taken over by the proletariat and used in the ‘transitional period’ to build
socialism—the state was seen by the anarchists as a fundamental obstacle to the
revolution which should be abolished at the outset. As Kropotkin puts it: ‘And
there are those who, like us, see in the State, not only its actual form and in all
forms of domination that it might assume, but in its very essence, an obstacle to the
social revolution.’22 As the anarchists correctly predicted, if the state was not
overcome in the revolution—which was imagined as a social rather than political
revolution, a revolution of society against political power—then state power
would be perpetuated and would give rise to new class contradictions and
hierarchies.
However, while this anarchist theory of the state as an autonomous structure of
power and domination that was irreducible to class relations and the economic
mode of production showed a greater sensitivity to the dangers of power than
was evident in the Marxist tradition, it was at the same time confined to a classical
paradigm of sovereignty. The state machines described by the anarchists of
the 19th century, with their rulers, bureaucrats, soldiers, policemen, gaolers,
executioners and priests, were relatively crude and autocratic apparatuses. While I
am not of course denying that the state exists today, or that its operation is often
brutally violent and oppressive, one would at the same time have to acknowledge
that the operation of power in contemporary societies is far more complex and
differentiated than was conceivable within the classical anarchist analysis. Can
power still be isolated within the state and within the symbolic framework of
sovereignty? Sovereignty itself, in our networked, global age, has become partially
deterritorialized and fragmented, spilling out beyond the traditional borders of the
nation-state; indeed, we see the continual blurring of borders, where diffuse
mechanisms of security, surveillance and control are no longer strictly determined
within national boundaries. Prisons that are not prisons but camps, wars that are no
longer wars but ‘policing’ operations, global networks of surveillance—we are in
the midst of, as Giorgio Agamben would put it, a zone of indistinction,23 in which
national sovereignty blurs into global security while at the same time reifying and
fetishizing existing borders, and mobilizing new ones everywhere.
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To point to such transformations is not a matter of placing in doubt the existence
of the state as an assemblage of power and domination, but rather of understanding
what ‘the state’ means today. Here I think it is more productive to adopt Foucault’s
approach and analyse the various permutations of state power from the classical
age onwards; and therefore to see the state in terms of various discourses,
rationalities and mechanisms of governmentality, security and biopolitics.24
However, this way of thinking about the state—not as an essence, but as a strategy
(or strategies)—implies a more ambiguous relationship with the social state: one
of intense interaction rather than opposition and oppression. We need to get away,
as Foucault says, from a certain classical image of state sovereignty. In developing
an alternative theorization of power based on war and the strategic mobilization of
force relations, rather than around questions of legitimacy, Foucault famously
proclaimed that ‘we need to cut off the king’s head’.25 In understanding power in
terms of war and strategy, rather than legitimacy and consent, Foucault shares
much with the anarchists, who also rejected social contract theories of sovereignty
in order to unmask the domination and violence behind these ideological veils.26
However, in calling for the symbolic decapitation of the sovereign ‘image’ of
power, Foucault is also making an important methodological point that in some
ways takes the analysis of power beyond the terrain of classical anarchist thought:
rather than seeing power as emanating from a certain symbolic structure of
sovereignty—a ‘ruling principle’—power should be studied from the ground up, at
the level of its capillary workings and at its infinitesimal limits. This does not
mean that state power no longer exists, but that it should be seen as the culmination
of power relations rather than their source. Power, from a Foucauldian point of
view, should be seen as co-extensive with society, running through the social
body and in everyday relations, and making possible diverse social practices of
punishing, absolving, disciplining, educating, healing, classifying, training,
guiding, and so on. As Foucault tells us, ‘power is everywhere because it comes
from everywhere’.27
Where this ‘post’-sovereign notion of power as dispersed, diffuse, differentiated
and, indeed, constitutive of social relations and identities, creates conceptual
difficulties for classical anarchism is that it makes problematic a state-centric view
of power as well as disturbing the idea of an ontological opposition between the
power and society. If power weaves itself into the fabric of society, then upon what
sort of foundation can the social revolution against power be imagined? Also, if
power is to be overthrown, where is it to be isolated? There is no more a Winter
Palace to storm or to destroy here, and any revolutionary discourse, in the light of
this revision in the theory of power, is faced with the much more complex task of
mapping the diverse forms of power that are found throughout the social field.
Indeed, the very idea of a revolution as an all-encompassing event that throws off
the shackles of power once and for all is much more difficult to conceive now.
Perhaps it makes more sense to think in terms of localized forms of resistance
around and against specific forms of domination, as well as the creation of
autonomous sites, practices, discourses and relationships in cracks of power and at
saul newman
320
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [G
old
sm
ith
s, 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
 L
on
do
n]
 at
 01
:19
 11
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
1 
its limits, rather than imagining that state power can be grasped and overthrown in
a totalizing sense.
Moreover, if we accept Foucault’s insight that power in one form or another will
always be with us—in the sense that power is constitutive of all social relations—
then we also have to question the idea of a final liberation from power. We do not
pass from a society of power to a society of freedom—as was the case in the
classical anarchist revolutionary narrative—but rather we engage in an ongoing
modification of relations of power through ethical practices of freedom. Foucault
makes the important point that the idea of liberation—while it should not be
abandoned—does not sufficiently take into account the forms of power that will
inevitably emerge in a post-liberation society. Therefore,
. . . this practice of liberation is not in itself sufficient to define the practices of freedom that
will still be needed if this people, this society, and these individuals are able to define
admissible and acceptable forms of existence or political society . . . .28
While anarchism, with its ethics of anti-authoritarianism and equal-liberty, is
best equipped to develop these sorts of practices of freedom, this would at the
same time involve a certain modification of its revolutionary grand narrative into a
new kind of micro-politics and ethics.
The displacement of the subject
A reformulation of anarchist theory would also involve a relinquishment of its
ontological foundation in a certain humanist and Enlightenment conception of the
subject—the subject who bears an essential humanity, understood in terms of an
innate goodness and rationality. This conception of the subject was very much part
of the discourse of classical anarchism, where its key proponents spoke of the
flourishing of humanity and the progressive enlightenment of mankind, as well as
an innate tendency towards solidarity and mutual aid. To cast doubt on such claims
is not to say that there is no possibility of mutual aid, rational action, free association
and voluntary cooperation—anarchism would not be thinkable at all without this
potential for radically different forms of social existence. However, I think it is
assuming too much to claim that these possibilities are somehow innate or inherited
human tendencies that exist latently within us as—to use Murray Bookchin’s
naturalistic metaphor—a flower waiting to blossom.29 Moreover, to remain
sceptical of such ideas does not mean, on the other hand, that one propagates a dark,
pessimistic, Hobbesian vision of humanity; this is equally essentialist, a kind of
inverse idealism. Rather, we should think of subjectivity as an indeterminate field of
possibilities, potentialities and often conflicting desires and drives.
For instance, psychoanalytic theory shows us that the subject is not a stable or
transparent entity, but, on the contrary, one that is thoroughly destabilized by the
unconscious—whether understood as the place of the drives, in Freudian terms, or
the constitutive limit of the symbolic order, as Lacan sees it. In neither formulation
can the subject be understood as an autonomous source of rational and moral
agency or as a series of intrinsic interests and properties that exist in opposition to
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power. Therefore, one of the major questions that psychoanalysis presents to
classical anarchism is that of voluntary servitude—in other words, the possibility
that, at some level, the subject desires his or her own domination.30 From Freud’s
psychoanalysis of groups, whose members fall in love with the figure of the
Leader,31 to Lacan’s ominous warning to the revolutionaries of May 1968 that
what they desired was a new Master,32 psychoanalysis has revealed what might be
considered a blind spot in classical revolutionary theory—the subject’s
psychological attachment to the power that dominates him. Psychoanalysis by
no means discounts the possibility of human emancipation, sociability and
voluntary cooperation: indeed, it points to conflicting tendencies in the subject and
in social interactions between the desire for harmonious coexistence and
aggressive desires for power and domination. It nevertheless serves as a warning to
radical politics about the difficulties associated with dislodging these more
authoritarian drives simply through a transformation in social and political
conditions. In other words, the revolution must go ‘all the way down’ to the psyche,
suggesting the need, once again, for a micro-politics and ethics of freedom—a
politics or, indeed, an ‘art’, as Foucault would put it, of ‘voluntary inservitude’.33
So we need to take account of the decentring and destabilization of the subject,
not only in psychoanalytic theory, but also in poststructuralist theory, where the
subject is constituted, albeit it in an indeterminate manner, through relations of
language and text (Derrida), assemblages of desire (Deleuze and Guattari), and
discourse and power (Foucault). Again, all this has important implications for a
revolutionary narrative based around the liberation of the subject from external
forces of oppression. The disciplinary and normalizing techniques and discourses
that, in the case of Foucault’s analysis, form the subject’s sense of him- or herself—
even the sense of himself as repressed—complicate any politics of emancipation:
‘[t]he man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the
effect of a subjection much more profound than himself.’34 All this is not, however,
to deny agency to the subject; indeed, it is to make possible new ways of thinking
about agency, no longer as based on an essential set of interests or properties, but
rather as practices and modes of action in which we create for ourselves new
subjectivities. The focus should not be on the unfolding of some sort of human
essence or immanent rationality, but rather on processes of subjectivization.
Here we should pay particular attention to Max Stirner’s vital distinction
between revolution and insurrection, in which the latter involves a kind of self-
transformation:
Revolution and insurrection must not be looked upon as synonymous. The former consists in an
overturning of conditions, of the established condition or status, the state or society, and is
accordingly a political or social act; the latter has indeed for its unavoidable consequence a
transformation of circumstances, yet does not start from it but from men’s discontent with
themselves, is not an armed rising but a rising of individuals, a getting up without regard to the
arrangements that spring from it. The Revolution aimed at new arrangements; insurrection leads
us no longer to let ourselves be arranged, but to arrange ourselves, and sets no glittering hopes on
‘institutions’. It is not a fight against the established, since, if it prospers, the established
collapses of itself; it is only a working forth of me out of the established.35
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A political anarchism?
In the earlier section, I have given a brief summary of the main implications of
poststructuralist and psychoanalytic theory for classical anarchism, implications
that, I would argue, should be taken into account in any attempt to renew
anarchism as radical politics. What emerges here is an understanding of anarchism
that retains a political and ethical commitment to equal liberty, anti-
authoritarianism and solidarity, but that is no longer reliant on ontological
foundations in science, biology, human nature or universal rationality. What
emerges through this deconstruction, then, is a post-foundational understanding of
anarchism: anarchism, no longer as a science, but as a politics. This is what I
propose we call postanarchism.
Yet, to speak of anarchism as a politics brings to light a strange paradox:
classical anarchism, in its rejection of state power and in its shunning of
involvement in state or parliamentary politics, often characterized itself as an anti-
politics. Indeed, Bakunin describes the main difference between socialists and
anarchists in terms of the former wanting to ‘pursue politics of a different kind’,
and the latter aiming at ‘the total abolition of politics.’36 While the former strategy
inevitably imprisons one within the paradigm of the state, the latter allows one to
transcend and emancipate oneself from the state entirely. Yet, while calling for the
abolition of politics in this way, classical anarchists also went into considerable
detail in discussing revolutionary tactics, questions of organization and the
mobilization of people, as well as the shape of post-revolutionary society—all of
which are, of course, political questions, indeed questions of power. So, classical
anarchism found itself in the slightly paradoxical position of affirming an anti-
political politics or a politics of anti-politics.
At the same time, this aporetic moment of tension central to classical anarchism
generates new and productive articulations of politics and ethics. The disjunction
between politics and anti-politics is what might be called an ‘inclusive’
disjunction: a compound in which one proposition is true only if its opposing
proposition is also true. Politics, at least in a radical, emancipatory sense, has only
a consistent identity if an anti-political, indeed utopian, dimension is also
present—otherwise it remains caught within existing political frameworks and
imaginaries. Conversely, anti-politics only makes sense if it takes seriously the
tasks of politics—building, constructing, organizing, fighting, making collective
decisions and so on—where questions of power and exclusion inevitably emerge.
However, this proximity to power does not invalidate anarchism; rather, it leads to
a greater sensitivity to the dangers of power and the need to invent, as mentioned
before, new micro-political practices of freedom through which power is subjected
to an ongoing ethical interrogation.
Where the political pole imposes certain limits, the anti-political pole, by
contrast, invokes an outside, a movement beyond limits. It is the signification of
the infinite, of the limitless horizon of possibilities. This is both the moment of
utopia and, in a different sense, the moment of ethics. Anarchism has an important
utopian dimension, even if the classical anarchists themselves claimed not to be
postanarchism
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utopians but materialists and rationalists. Indeed, some utopian element—whether
acknowledged or not—is an essential part of any form of radical politics; to oppose
the current order, one inevitably invokes an alternative, utopian imagination.
However, we should try to formulate a different approach to utopianism here: the
importance of imagining an alternative to the current order is not to lay down a
precise programme for the future, but rather to provide a point of exteriority as a
way of interrogating the limits of this order. As Miguel Abensour puts it: ‘Is it not
proper to utopia to propose a new way of proceeding to a displacement of what
is and what seems to go without saying in the crushing name of “reality”?’37 We
are crushed under the weight of the current order, which tells us that this is our
reality, that what we have now is all there is and all there ever will be. Utopia
provides an escape from this stifling reality by imagining an alternative to it; it
opens up different possibilities, new ‘lines of flight’. Here, we should think about
utopia in terms of action in the immediate sense, of creating alternatives within the
present, at localized points, rather than waiting for the revolution. Utopia is
something that emerges in political struggles themselves.38
Ethics also implies an outside to the existing order, but in a different sense.
Ethics, as I understand it here, involves the opening up of the existing political
identities, practices, institutions and discourses to an Other which is beyond their
terms. Ethics is more than the application of moral and rational norms. It is rather
the continual disturbance of the sovereignty of these norms, and the identities and
institutions that draw their legitimacy from them, in the name of something that
exceeds their grasp. Importantly, then, ethics is what disturbs politics from the
outside. This might be understood in the Levinasian sense of ‘anarchy’: ‘Anarchy
cannot be sovereign like an arche. It can only disturb the State—but in a radical
way, making possible moments of negation without any affirmation.’39
The point is, however, that politics cannot do without anti-politics, and
vice versa. The two must go together. There must always be an anti-political
outside, a utopian moment of rupture and excess that disturbs the limits of politics.
The ethical moment cannot be eclipsed by the political dimension; nor can it be
separated from it, as someone like Carl Schmitt maintained.40 If there is to be a
concept of the political, it can only be thought through a certain constitutive
tension with ethics. At the same time, anti-politics needs to be politically
articulated; it needs to be put into action through actual struggles and engagements
with different forms of domination. There must be some way of politically
measuring the anti-political imaginery, through victories, defeats, and strategic
gains and reversals. So while anti-politics points to a transcendence of the current
order, it cannot be an escape from it; it must involve an encounter with its limits,
and this is where politics comes in. The transcendence of power involves an active
engagement with power, not an avoidance of it; the realization of freedom requires
an ongoing elaboration of new practices of freedom within the context of power
relations.
However, the necessity of engaging with and thinking through power relations
does not mean that anarchism today has to abandon the ethical and political
horizon of the transcendence of governmental power. What I am suggesting is that
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this is more productively thought in terms of a project of autonomy. Rather than
the attainment of an eternal society of freedom beyond the world of power,
anarchism should be understood as an ongoing project in which the limits of power
are critically interrogated. Liberty is something to be continually and collectively
reinvented, rather than simply discovered at the bedrock of human nature. Central
to this project is the re-situation of politics outside the representative framework of
the state. We should no longer regard the state—an increasingly ambiguous and
fragmented arrangement of power in any case—as the basic site of the political.
On the contrary, the state is often the order of de-politicization, where the
insurgent, anarchic dimension of politics is policed, controlled, regulated and
domesticated, channelled into, and thus vitiated within its symbolic structures.
Indeed, if we look around us, and if we look with a different gaze—one that is
less focused on the symbols of sovereignty and the formal institutions of power—
we can see the emergence of an alternative conception of the political on the
terrain that is (inadequately) referred to as ‘civil society’: not only massive
mobilizations against global capitalism and war, but also, at a more micro-political
level, diverse affinity groups, autonomous movements, social centres, communes,
independent media centres, political practices, symbolic gestures and direct action
techniques. These constitute alternative sites of decision-making and collective
action, and alternative forms of political existence. So if we take, as Foucault
counsels us to do, a less universalistic and more partisan gaze—the gaze of the
militant rather than the jurist or philosopher-king—we find in this alternative and
dissenting world, new possibilities of autonomous political life. Indeed, one could
say that the autonomy of the political—so long a preoccupation of political theory,
from Machiavelli to Carl Schmitt—today only makes sense as a politics of
autonomy.
Conclusion
Postanarchism thus effects a displacement of the political from the state order,
renewing the possibilities of anarchism today as a practice of politics and a project
of autonomy. As I have shown, this is only possible through rethinking some of the
conceptual categories and epistemological foundations of classical anarchism.
However, this modification of anarchism along post-foundational lines does not in
any sense suggest that anarchism as a political ideology is somehow out of date.
On the contrary, it is to affirm anarchism’s relevance today to social movements
and new forms of struggle—indeed, to affirm anarchism as the politico-ethical
horizon in relation to which radical politics today must situate itself—that this
theoretical study has been carried out.
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